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Negative publicity is a common tax management measure. But its effect has been 
controversial. Does exposure of tax evasion promote tax compliance? Based on the 
analysis of behavioral economics on the basis of social psychology, negative publicity 
can increase the degree of tax compliance by improving the social psychological 
mechanism of shame. But at the same time ,the negative public may also bring about 
the stigma, resulting in human behavior "po guan zi po shuai", so as to improve the 
taxpayer's tax evasion intention. In addition, does the mechanism of negative publicity 
still play a theoretical role behind the Chinese social and cultural background? It's 
worth thinking about. 
In order to find out the answers to these questions above. Based on behavioral 
economics theory, referring to the design of experimental economics of foreign 
scholars, utilizing the Xiamen University financial research laboratory, this paper set 
experiment to detect answers. The experiment was divided into experimental group 
and control group. The reaction of experimenters to different methods between the 
experimental group and control group would be analyzed to detect the impact of 
negative publicity and stigma effect on tax compliance. The experimental results 
shows that the penalty cannot effectively reduce the decision of the subject's tax 
evasion, but the exposure of the experimenter's photo can significantly inhibit the 
experimenter's tax evasion behavior. At the same time, the response of experimenter 
to the differences between the experimental group (no stigma effect) and control 
group (existing stigma effect) are significantly different. Compared with the 
experimenters of experimental group, the experimenters of control group which is the  
treatment of stigma was more dissatisfied, and easier to tax evasion. 
This paper tests the role of the exposure of violations to tax compliance in an 
approximately realistic environment, and reveals the side-effect of this kind of 
negative publicity may bring. It has important theoretical significance and practical 
significance to study for expanding the extension of tax compliance in China and 
improving the management level of Taxation of our country. 
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段，本文主要运用苏黎世大学研发的 ztree 软件。 
ztree 主要有两部分组成，一部分叫做 ztree,另外一部分叫做 zleaf。ztree 用
来搭载实验程序。而 zleaf 则是实验的终端，每一个实验者所操作的电脑，都是
一个 zleaf 终端。在实验过程中，实验者通过在 zleaf 的操作来实现与实验的互动。
同时，zleaf 将数据传输给 ztree，有效的控制了实验的进程。由 ztree 收集的数据
具有极强的可读性，为设计者分析实验数据和研究实验结果起到了至关重要的作
用。 
对于实验获取的数据，本文先将所得数据进行统计性描述，采用 rank-sum test 
以及中位数检验分析实验组与对照组的数据之间是否具有显著差异，运用
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test 检验实验组与对照组的数据分布之间的差异。接着，
本文构建计量经济学的模型，在运用 probit 和 Tobit 模型下，分析曝光措施和曝
光的持续性对逃税强度的影响。probit 模型的因变量为逃税和不逃税的选择，量
化为 1 或 0；本模型主要检验自变量对于实验者做出逃税者决定的影响。 采用


















































































































































Kahneman 以及 Tversky(1978)的前景理论（prospect theory）运用到税收遵从的


















联邦和州的结合税的纳税者，平均来说，税率下降 10%到 0.36 预期可以使隐匿
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